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Abstract
It is often said that history matters, but these words are often little more than a hol-
low statement. In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the view that the economy is a 
mechanical toy that can be fixed using a few simple tools has continued to be held by 
economists and policy makers and echoed by the media. The paper addresses the ori-
gins of this unfortunate belief, inherent to neoliberalism, and what can be done to bring 
time back into public discourse.
Zusammenfassung
Es heißt, dass Geschichte wichtig sei, aber oft ist dies nicht mehr als eine Redensart. 
Ökonomen und Politiker halten mit Unterstützung der Medien auch nach der Großen 
Rezession an der Ansicht fest, dass die Wirtschaft ein mechanisches Spielzeug ist, das 
mit ein paar einfachen Werkzeugen repariert werden kann. In dem vorliegenden Papier 
betrachtet der Autor die Ursprünge dieses dem Neoliberalismus innewohnenden Irr-
glaubens und untersucht, wie geschichtlich-zeitliche Zusammenhänge zurück in den 
öffentlichen Diskurs gebracht werden können.
MPIfG Discussion Paper 13/6  |  Boldizzoni: On History and Policy iv
Contents
1 A science of change 3
2 Natural law and the mechanical clock 4
3 Social engineering 6
4 Modern myths 7
5 Pseudohistories 9
6 History and the emperor’s new clothes 10
References  11
MPIfG Discussion Paper 13/6  |  Boldizzoni: On History and Policy 1
On History and Policy: Time in the Age of Neoliberalism
When Queen Elizabeth II visited the London School of Economics in November 2008, 
in the middle of the credit crunch, she asked a seemingly naïve question that would 
resonate worldwide: “How come nobody could foresee it?” It took eight months and 
a seminar organized at the British Academy for some of the country’s most influential 
economists to respond (Stewart 2009: 1). “In summary, Your Majesty,” they concluded 
in their letter of July 2009, “the failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity of the 
crisis and to head it off, while it had many causes, was principally a failure of the col-
lective imagination of many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to 
understand the risks to the system as a whole” (Besley/Hennessy 2009).
A few weeks later another missive reached Buckingham Palace. It was signed by ten 
heterodox economists, admittedly expressing a minority view. They pointed out that 
the mainstream “overlooks the part that many leading economists have had in turning 
economics into a discipline that is detached from the real world, and in promoting un-
realistic assumptions that have helped to sustain an uncritical view of how markets op-
erate” (Hodgson et al. 2009). While they emphasized the “typical omission” of psychol-
ogy, philosophy, and economic history from the theorists’ academic training, they did 
not explain what particular advantage the study of history should bring about, apart 
from a reference to the awareness of “historical precedents.” Similarly, Lord Skidelsky, 
Keynes’ passionate biographer, called for the reform of economic education. It was clear 
to him that the Master was back and ready to bowl over his narrow-minded successors. 
He elaborated a bit more on the role of history and other Geisteswissenschaften, argu-
ing that their study would alter the economists’ perception of economics as a “natural” 
rather than a “moral” science (Skidelsky 2009: 189).
The topic I address here, namely the relationship between history and policy, is prob-
lematic indeed. Historians would be tempted to say that one should not suggest such a 
link because the past does not repeat itself and history has no lessons to teach; not to 
mention the risks and dangers of presentism.
In selecting the questions to be asked, the historian is always influenced to some degree 
by the context in which he lives and by the problems of his time.1 To a large extent, the 
extraordinary growth of economic history in the 1930s was due to the great economic 
This paper is based on a public lecture the author held at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of 
Societies in Cologne on January 24, 2013.
1 This is what Benedetto Croce famously argued with his phrase that “All history is contemporary 
history,” a view also shared by R. G. Collingwood. It is interesting to note, as Richard Evans does 
(1997: 30–31), that this idea took shape in the interwar period.
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turmoil and social distress of those years. Another golden age for the discipline (but 
also for the Western economies, in this case) was the postwar period, when experiences 
of economic development needed to be put into perspective. This kind of dynamics can 
be observed in all historical subfields. The present fortunes of gender history or envi-
ronmental history – just to mention a couple of examples – would have been unthink-
able fifty years ago.
There is nothing wrong in acknowledging the influence exerted by the present on the 
questions we pose; what is important is not to let the present drive our search for the 
answers, because this would mean that we no longer respect the otherness of the past. 
This threat, however, is omnipresent, whatever the point of departure of historical in-
vestigation.
History does not help avoid the kind of mistakes made in the past, nor does it help make 
the right decisions on the basis of past experience, as if it was a learning-by-doing exer-
cise. I am not much convinced by the lessons-from-the-Great-Depression literary genre, 
which has experienced an impressive revival in recent years. History cannot be useful if 
one expects from it such trivial and mechanistic prescriptions. 
The Great Depression and the so-called “Great Recession,” although comparable in in-
tensity, are two very different phenomena, generated by different causes. The crash of 
1929 was the tip of the iceberg in an overproduction crisis, or the last and most vehe-
ment symptom of the market saturation that was affecting the American economy in 
the twilight of the “Roaring Twenties.” On the contrary, the origins of the 2008-9 crisis 
are to be sought entirely in the financial sector, in the speculative motives of rentiers, 
the excessive power of investment banks, and the poor system of rules allowing such 
things as the “subprime bubble” to happen. Nevertheless, an analysis of the two phe-
nomena shows the existence of common mechanisms at work, and these mechanisms 
are related to the inherent instability of capitalism, something on which both Keynes 
and Schumpeter would agree. But analogies stop at this very general level, precisely 
when we abstract from the plane of individual historical situations to consider the eco-
nomic and social system – an old-fashioned Marxist would call it the mode of produc-
tion’ – of which they are a part. This is where the study of the past meets social theory.
The opposite of the “lessons-to-learn” take on history is the view that “the past is worth 
studying for its own sake.” I can subscribe only partially to this proposition. This view 
is beneficial as long as it serves to discourage those who wish to draw some immediate, 
practical utility from the study of history. However, such a statement fails to recognize 
the deeper motivations that lead humankind to question the past. If the past is dead, 
that is, if it no longer relates to us in any way, there would be no reason to deal with it, 
except for antiquarianism. On the contrary, we clearly continue to deal with the past 
because we feel that, no matter how distant and different it is, it is not alien to us. This 
does not apply just to the historian but also to the layperson, as history, even its aca-
demic practice, is always tied to memory (Douglas 1986: 69–70).
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1 A science of change
Rather than thinking of history as the science of the past, we may look at it as the “sci-
ence of men in time.” This concise definition, which we owe to Marc Bloch, means that 
the object of history is society, not the individual. History is therefore a social science, 
one approaching its subject matter from a very special angle, that of time. In other 
words, it is a “science of change” (Bloch 1992: 21–22).
History, then, deals with the evolution of societies across time. Yet, the sense of time, 
that is, historical sense, is by no means universal. The need to maintain public memory, 
a need common to all societies, can be regarded as universal. But there are ways to con-
struct shared memories without taking time into account. 
The ancient Greeks had no historical sense, not in the current meaning of the term, and 
this remains surprisingly true from the Archaic period until the time of the Roman 
conquest. After all, they had no historians, and those who wrote about contemporary 
history, like Thucydides, did not really consider themselves as such. The Greek collec-
tive memory lay in the “timeless myth” (Finley 1975: 14–15). We find similar examples 
in many other ancient non-European civilizations in the Near East as well as in South 
and Central Asia (Woolf 2011: 31, 92, 171).
The need to entrust collective memory to history rather than to the myth does not seem 
to depend so much on having a cyclical or linear conception of time (the latter being 
common to most written cultures) but rather on how fast time is perceived as passing.2 
In a society that does not experience dramatic changes there is no need to make sense 
of these changes. It is not by chance that studies of economic history tend to flourish 
in developing countries, as is happening today in China and Latin America. Traditional 
societies are normally not interested in their economic past (and perhaps have more 
pressing concerns) while postmodern societies are keen to forget it.
Prior to the British industrial revolution we find no accounts that we may call economic 
history, at least in the Western world. One reason for this is that nothing unusual was 
happening in the economic sphere to create a sense of discontinuity. The other reason 
is the superior status traditionally attached to political events, another belief that was 
starting to be challenged at that time.
2 Cf. Koselleck (2004). Jack Goody (1977: 14–15, 2006: 24) indicates that a writing culture is nec-
essary for developing both a linear conception of time and historical attitudes but this is clearly 
not the same as saying that it is a sufficient condition.
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Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus, and Karl Marx wrote about the 
great transformations that were shaping the first modern economy. Each of them cap-
tured some particular aspect (Boldizzoni 2008: chs. 3–5). All of them, except Ricardo, 
who was a clever yet rather uncultivated man, also tried to understand how things had 
evolved. 
Thus, for example, Smith tells us that everything began when, “for a pair of diamond 
buckles perhaps, or for something as frivolous and useless, [the feudal lords] exchanged 
the maintenance … of a thousand men for a year, and with it the whole weight and 
authority which it could give them” (Smith [1776]1976: 418–419). That is indeed a 
description of the early origins of capitalism, although it is probably inaccurate and 
certainly stylized. Neither Smith nor any classical economist ever used the word capital-
ism; nonetheless, they started formulating historical hypotheses.3
2 Natural law and the mechanical clock
During the Enlightenment, however, the seeds of a dangerous idea were planted. Philos-
ophers speculated about the existence of a natural order extending to the social sphere 
and mirroring natural law. Since the principles of natural law were inscribed in reason, 
they could only be understood through reason, which means deductively. Therefore, 
human institutions had to be explained not in evolutionary terms, but rather as the 
outcome of a social contract. This entailed the negation of time. 
Despite recent claims about the existence of a Radical Enlightenment in economics, 
one more concerned with social justice than “moderate, mainstream Enlightenment,” 
economic thought of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries generally acknowl-
edged the operation of natural laws in this domain and sought to protect them from 
the interference of politics.4 Such laws, like the law of diminishing returns and the iron 
law of wages, were assumed to be universal and eternal. This is what led Friedrich List 
to label the classical theory “cosmopolitical economy,” which to him meant intellectual 
utopia. “True political economy” had to take national and historical specificities into 
account (List [1841]1856: 189ff.).
Theories of natural order developed into a weak form and a strong form with Smith’s 
moral philosophy and subsequent economic analysis situated in between. The weak 
formulation stayed within the limits of economics. It argued in favor of free trade based 
on the advantages that this would bring to the actors and to society as a whole. This 
3 On the history of the word “capitalism” see Kocka (2010: 9). 
4 I have not forgotten Ferdinando Galiani (1728–1787), the exception that proves the rule. He was 
anything but a radical thinker though, pace Jonathan Israel (2010: ch. 3).
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view was typical of physiocracy. Smith’s big picture is certainly a dynamic one, but the 
actors’ psychology, including the representation of sympathy, is already tainted with 
materialist reductionism. And, in the Wealth of Nations, the invisible hand performs the 
same role as the mechanical clock does in Newtonian cosmology.5 Once it has been set 
in motion by the Great Clockmaker, the clock runs on its own. 
Then we have the strong formulation, fathered by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes wrote little 
about markets, but the Leviathan is unquestionably the first treatise where politics is 
reduced to modern economic terms and “practically all human relations are contract” 
(Labiano 2000: 144). He argued that men are selfish and bound together by fear. Only 
out of fear are they willing to give up some of their freedom and transfer it to the state, 
an artificial body responsible for third-party enforcement. The decision to enter into 
society is an economic decision in that it involves the buying and selling of rights. In 
this way, economic order creates political order. 
Late nineteenth-century scientism helped turn economics into a natural science, a sort 
of social physics; or, at least, it fostered this illusion (Mirowski 1989: ch. 5). This phase of 
neoclassical economics lasted until the Great Depression and was resumed after World 
War II. For the next twenty-five years it had to coexist, both in theory and in practice, 
with Keynesianism. So great had been the shock suffered by Western economies during 
the interwar period that the idea of simply putting Keynes aside was out of the ques-
tion, however tempting some found this idea. But as soon as confidence was restored, a 
chain of events was set off. Supply-side macroeconomic instability in the 1970s offered 
an argument against state intervention, which was said to be ineffective. The Chicago 
revolution led to a paradigm shift and the rational choice program redefined economics 
as a general theory of action. The slowdown of growth and accumulation of public debt 
brought conservative governments to power in the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and West Germany. Moreover, the decline and fall of the Soviet Union strengthened the 
pride of this right-wing establishment. In the very same year that Francis Fukuyama 
proclaimed the “end of history,” the Third World was bound to implement economic 
policies prescribed by the Washington Consensus (1989). The age of neoliberalism had 
reached its peak (Harvey 2005: 13).
The most distinctive feature of neoliberalism vis-à-vis classical liberalism is its ambition 
to transform society. Exchange no longer occupies center stage. As Michel Foucault put 
it in The Birth of Biopolitics, “the problem of neo-liberalism is rather how the overall 
exercise of political power can be modeled on the principles of a market economy … 
to discover how far and to what extent the formal principles of a market economy 
can index a general art of government” (Foucault 2008: 131). Neoliberal policies aim 
to impose competition as the basic rule of social interaction. This explains the grow-
ing interest in law and politics on the part of economists, as reflected in the creation 
5 On Smith’s moral philosophy and its interpretations, see Broadie (2006); on Newton’s influence 
Hetherington (1983).
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of hybrid academic fields. The economic analysis of law is now forty years old. The 
new institutional economics, established later in the 1970s, has gradually evolved into 
a theory of the state. Political economics (not to be confused with political economy) 
gained momentum in the 1990s. It considers political systems and constitutions from 
the standpoint of efficiency and suggests ways to set the “rules of the game” that may 
promote social and cultural change.
3 Social engineering
Today, this neoliberal social engineering project is pursued by think tanks such as the 
American Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute, and the Heritage Foundation, but 
also by university-affiliated ones such as the Stanford-based Hoover Institution and 
the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. The latter, for instance, gathers an 
interdisciplinary team of social scientists under the hegemonic leadership of econom-
ics. They present themselves as united in a common mission: “Mercatus research, as our 
name implies, is focused on how markets solve problems,” not only American problems, 
but “problems in the world,” including African poverty, financial crises, natural disas-
ters, health care and social security, government spending, and, last but not least, social 
change.6 Sociology, political science, law, and history are constrained by the straitjacket 
of the new institutional economics and used to confirm the pre-packaged theorems of 
global competition and growth. 
Europe, too, has become a generator of neoliberal ideas and is home to more than one 
hundred think tanks, most of which are part of the Stockholm Network, established in 
1997. Transatlantic associations and “discussion groups” have been around longer than 
that, thus ensuring cooperation between corporate lobbyists, politicians, and opinion-
makers. There are nuances indeed, and one could legitimately argue that the prevailing 
doctrine on this side of the Atlantic has rather grown out of postwar ordoliberalism. 
Yet I will disregard such differences because they are outweighed by two common ele-
ments: the tenet that economic order creates political order, and a passion for social 
engineering. In fact, no social engineer could imagine a better lab for experimentation 
than the European Union as it presently stands. Some of its inherent features make it 
particularly suitable. To begin with, it is a supranational polity, not a federation of na-
tions, which appeals to the Enlightenment utopia. Market integration and monetary 
unification have preceded any serious attempt at political unification. Therefore, the 
Eurozone finds itself in a rather odd situation: national economic policies are condi-
tioned to a somewhat large extent by the centralized monetary policy of the ECB and 
6 See <http://mercatus.org/content/about> [accessed August 2012]
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by decisions of the European Commission, whose officials are not elected. This is part 
of a wider problem known as the European Union’s “democratic deficit,” a term coined 
many years ago to describe the lack of accountability of European institutions.
In 2011, an unprecedented step was taken when former EU technocrats were catapulted 
to top government positions in Athens and Rome. Jürgen Habermas was among the 
first to announce this “quiet coup d’état” in his penetrating essay Zur Verfassung Eu-
ropas (Habermas 2011). Italy’s prime minister, Mario Monti, had the singular fate of 
being called upon to rescue the country from international speculation after he had 
spent many years on the payroll of Goldman Sachs, a remarkable junk-bond producer 
(Streeck 2012: 64). He is certainly a modern champion of the free-trade “cosmopolitan-
ism” about which List wrote, as is evident not so much in his theoretical work, dating 
back to the early 1970s, as in his international lobbying activities. It is interesting to note 
how his austerity plan and projected structural reforms were justified to the public, as 
if it was the economy, not politics, that demanded them. The reforms were neither good 
nor bad – they were necessary. This rhetoric of objectification, so to speak, whereby the 
economy is attributed an independent and neutral existence, was promptly embraced 
by the leading media. The main parties also endorsed it, as long as it was convenient for 
them. After all, this is the country of Machiavelli. 
Thus for several months Mr. Monti, like the emperor described in Andersen’s tale, 
“marched in procession under his beautiful canopy … and the chamberlains walked 
along behind carrying the train that wasn’t there.” In February 2012, he declared to 
Time magazine that Italians had to be educated in the values of competition and meri-
tocracy and that he was committed to changing their mentality. One does not need to 
be an anthropologist to realize how wishful such thinking is. Then history materialized 
in the form of social conflict, and the government had to face the hostility of the trade 
unions, the pharmacists, the teachers, the students, the students’ parents, the elderly, 
and the unemployed, not all of whom fit comfortably in the category of “rent-seeker.” 
In the summer, the Wall Street Journal reported in a more sober tone: “Mr. Monti says 
he is doing what he can to change Italy – and Italian behavior – but he needs parliament 
to approve laws” (Galloni/Wolker 2012). Thankfully, let me say. 
4 Modern myths
In his recent book The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural 
Order, the law scholar Bernard Harcourt puts forward an interesting thesis with a Fou-
cauldian flavor. He argues that “the notion of liberty associated with contemporary free 
markets is a historical artifact,” because these are “as fully regulated as any previous 
economic order,” although in a different way (Harcourt 2011: 242). Where a public 
rhetoric exists of the state as a night watchman, it pushes the state’s regulatory appara-
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tus to focus almost exclusively on the repression of deviance, leading to the “paradoxical 
alchemy of market liberalism and legal despotism” (ibid.: 241). The target here is the 
law-and-economics approach and its influence on the US judicial system, but a similar 
paradox emerges when we consider recent developments in public choice theory. The 
rule of the market is pushed to such an extreme that its coexistence with democracy is 
questioned and the tyranny of the majority is blamed for forcing elected rulers to pur-
sue irrational policies (Caplan 2007). Curiously enough, one of the arguments used to 
justify the facts of 2011 was that the technocratic governments were appointed under 
a “state of emergency.” This concept of Ausnahmezustand has an interesting intellectual 
history and, as we know, a tragic one. 
The title of Harcourt’s book contains the word myth. Is this to be understood in a purely 
metaphorical sense? If we take Sir James Frazer’s concept of myth literally, as a repre-
sentation arising out of a misunderstanding of natural laws and leading to baseless 
“policies” (the rituals), then even modern faith in the natural order of markets has a 
mythical character. Frazer, however, would be rather disappointed, for this would sub-
vert his tripartite, stage-like theory of human culture, where magic precedes religion, 
which in turn precedes science (Frazer [1890]1980). Why mankind still needs myths in 
the age of disenchantment is an interesting question that is left to our anthropological 
colleagues to answer.7 Myths are harmless until they start invading the terrain of science, 
that is to say, when they are taught at university and enter textbooks. Should myths be 
viewed as models for policy-making and embraced by governments and international 
organizations, the consequences can be serious. The devastating impact of the “Chicago 
boys” on the Chilean economy and society in the 1970s and 1980s obviously represents 
a worst-case scenario, for it was the result of a deliberate plan of “ideological transfer” 
from a neocolonial power to a satellite country (Valdés 1995). The effects of their poli-
cies, however, are not related to the brutal overthrow of the Allende government and 
could have been equally serious if such policies had been implemented under demo-
cratic rule. 
It is the duty of historians to dispel the myths of pseudoscience. This makes them re-
sponsible to society.
7 Two important works on modern myths, from the fields of comparative religion and psycho-
analysis, are Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane (1959), and D. W. Winnicott, Playing and 
Reality (1971), particularly ch. 1.
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5 Pseudohistories
Unfortunately this task is complicated by the fact that historians have no monopoly 
over the past and its uses. Paradoxically, history itself can be abused and interpretations 
of the past reduced to instruments of persuasion (Boldizzoni 2011). The resulting nar-
ratives can be categorized as pseudohistories. 
Some time ago I was interviewed by a German newspaper and asked about my opin-
ion of Reinhart and Rogoff ’s work on financial crises, which became an issue during 
the recent US presidential campaign (Reinhart/Rogoff 2009). Their argument is that 
high public debt has been the root of all evil over the past eight centuries, hindering 
economic growth and causing recessions. Hence they endorse restrictive fiscal policies 
as a panacea. I found this thesis bizarre, but stranger still was the fact that an amateur 
account comparing Florentine bankruptcies of the 1340s to Latin American defaults 
could serve to judge Barack Obama’s effectiveness as a policy-maker.
There are clues that allow a trained eye to recognize pseudohistories at first sight, even 
from a book jacket. Whereas history is complex, pseudohistories typically make strong 
claims and propose one-size-fits-all interpretive keys. They bear such pompous titles 
as Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (Acemoglu/Robin-
son 2012). This is a work by Acemoglu and Robinson attempting to demonstrate that 
something is wrong with the cultural systems underlying Third World economies, as 
they failed to develop ‘inclusive’ institutions protecting individual property rights and 
fostering entrepreneurship. 
Another influential contribution to this field is North, Wallis, and Weingast’s Violence 
and Social Orders (North/Wallis/Weingast 2009). The title sounds just sinister. The sub-
title, A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, is more infor-
mative about the book’s modest scope. Douglass North and his co-authors have been 
advising the World Bank for some years on the issue of institutional barriers to devel-
opment (The World Bank 2007: 53–54; see also North et al. 2013). In their view, most 
approaches to development have been unsuccessful because they did not address the 
problem of violence first. How can international organizations help solve this prob-
lem? Well, they should put the money in the hands of dictators. Once violence is under 
control, underdeveloped countries will know how to get rid of them and will eventu-
ally evolve into Western-style democracies and market economies. As you see, Hobbes 
strikes back. But he does so with World Bank money.
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6 History and the emperor’s new clothes
It is now time to return to our initial question about the purpose of history and how can 
it be useful in the public sphere. I would say that history is both a search for meaning 
and an injection of antibodies. 
Sociology and history share a more realistic view of the economy as embedded in a 
meaningful system of social relations. This involves a common conception of rational-
ity, institutions, and human culture. The way these have interacted over time to form 
the environment we live in is not self-evident and has to be uncovered. When the goal 
is to understand a living organism, which is what society is, a film is more informative 
than a snapshot.
Such an approach may well sound familiar to most humanistic social scientists, but to 
those outside academia – I mean laypeople, journalists, and politicians too – it probably 
does not. They are still trapped in what I would call the clockwork view of the economy 
and this makes it easier for the engineers to get in. However, something has changed 
since the latest recession. There are signs that the trust in the economic profession has 
diminished, and many people feel that these times of economic and social upheaval 
demand deeper understanding.
The public should be warned that economic systems are historically determined and be 
reminded that capitalism has evolved over time. Modern capitalism, democratic capi-
talism, and post-democratic capitalism have followed one another over the past three 
centuries. Further transformations can be expected, though it is difficult to predict the 
direction these will take. The public should also be made aware that the economy is a 
social construction, a man-made environment. It is not an iron cage constraining hu-
man action, nor is economic policy ever a one-way street. 
When people are asked to give up job security because this is supposed to foster eco-
nomic growth, they should not let this claim go unchallenged. When politicians are 
advised that higher labor productivity and a weaker welfare state are needed in order 
for Europe to compete with China on growth, they should be reminded that such a goal 
is unrealistic. Countries can industrialize only once. The economies of Western Europe 
took off a long time ago and are now close to what John Stuart Mill called a “stationary 
state.” The refusal to accept this is like the refusal to accept ageing as part of life. Like old 
age, the stationary state has its positive aspects. For example, it might bring about less 
pollution and more social justice.
Keynes firmly believed in the power of ideas. But this is not the kind of battle that can 
be fought from a university chair. The sorcerer’s apprentices who are sacrificing society 
on the altar of utopia differ in one substantial respect from the “madmen in authority” 
described in the General Theory. They are not the slaves of some defunct economist for 
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their masters are alive and well. More importantly, the “technostructure” of which they 
are a part is the expression of vested interests, and their ideology is flexible enough to 
accommodate such interests (Keynes 1936: 383; Galbraith 1967; Crouch 2011).
The historian, as a public intellectual, is just as powerless as the child in Andersen’s tale. 
Nevertheless, he is in the position to say that the emperor is naked. This will not stop 
the procession, but at least the others will know.
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